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Conflicts of interests are often dealt with by arguing that individ- 
uals, not institutions, are responsible for behaving unethically. In 
fact, institutions often push individuals to behave unethically. 
Individuals would need to be heroes to behave differently. This is 
particularly visible in organizations whose members are profes- 
sionals; as brokers and boundary spanners, they use conflicts of 
interests to increase the power of their firm. Organizations cover 
themselves against accusations of unethical behavior by intro- 
ducing formal organizational separations between their members, 
replicating inside the organization the boundaries that reflect 
external conflict. An example of such organizational devices are 
provided by Chinese walls. Using a network study of a New Eng- 
land corporate law firm, I look into the black box of such organi- 
zations and show that it is impossible for members to respect 
such Chinese walls unless they are heroes. The question arising 
from this analysis is, therefore, whether or not it is time for such 
professional firms to shrink to greatness. If members cannot be 
expected to be heroes, should their institutions not be redesigned 
so as to prevent unethical behavior without counting on their 
heroism? 
Florindo: Tu hai servito due padroni nel medesimo tempo?
Truffaldino: Sior si, mi ho fatto sta bravura. Son intrà in sto 
impegno senza pensarghe; m’ho volesto provar. Ho durà 
poco, è vero, ma almanco ho la gloria che nissun m’aveva 
ancora scoverto, se da per mi no me descovriva per l’amor 
de quella ragazza. 
Il servitore di due padroni Carlo Goldoni
Conflicts of interest are a classical ethical preoccupation 
for many professions: for lawyers who successively or 
concurrently represent potentially competing clients; for 
medical doctors who, for instance, have to manage the 
transfer of organs, or own a laboratory in which they 
send their clients for medical tests; for industrial engi-
neers who move from one employer to another and have 
to sign agreements preventing them from working for 
the competition on the same matters for at least two to 
five years; for U.S. bankers who, for many years, were 
not allowed to underwrite securities, and so on. The 
problem looms large when conflicts of allegiance di- 
vide actors invested with some discretion and trust.
These professions have traditionally tried to deal 
with this problem by formulating codes of deontology 
that are meant to protect confidentiality and secrecy in 
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?* the relationship between the professional and the client. However, the recent growth of organizations (both pri- 
vate and public) that employ professionals and semi- 
professionals (such as law firms, hospitals, advertising 
agencies, or financial institutions), their increasing spe-
cialization, the increased mobility of their members, and 
the flexibility of their labor markets all contribute to the 
need to redefine this problem and design new measures 
to deal with it.  
I argue here that such organizations actively seek con-
flicts of interests, then put their members in what could 
be called a »situation.« Situations of conflicts of inter-
ests are opportunities for organizations to increase bro- 
kerage capacity, access to resources, and access to power. 
As long as they can hide the fact that they are exposed 
to conflicts (Katz, 1977), or as long as they can blame 
their individual members for unethical behavior when 
they get caught, organizations look for network posi- 
tions that help them span multiple boundaries, mediate 
between conflicting interests, create procedures that 
become a form of »weak culture,« in Breiger’s sense 
(Breiger, 2010; Pachuck and Breiger, 2010; Schultz and 
Breiger, 2010), that helps them reframe so as to dodge 
the substantive issue1. Individual members are ex-
pected both to put the interests of the organization 
first and not to behave like heroes.  
To illustrate, I focus on corporate lawyers in corpo- 
rate law firms. First, I define the problem of conflicts of 
interests in such firms as well as a self-regulatory solu- 
tion to these problems that these firms have pro- 
moted, namely the so-called Chinese walls. Second, I 
take the case of conflicts of interests in a New England 
corporate law firm which I have observed from an or- 
ganizational perspective (Lazega, 2001) in order to under-
stand the social discipline2 that characterizes cooper-
ation between its rival partners – but also prevent these 
partners from making weekly, costly, unfriendly, and 
heroic ethical decisions concerning conflicts of interests. 
This approach questions the efficiency of the Chinese 
walls solution to conflicts of interests and raises the 
issue of institutional redesign making the ethical de- 
livery of such services less dependent upon members’ 
heroism. 
Large corporate law firms as brokers, mediators, and 
boundary spanners
The mediatory role of corporate lawyers in internation- 
al business is particularly important in the absence of 
true business law and stabilized market rules3. Large 
corporate law firms can be regarded as powerful players 
in modern globalization. Sellers (1991) calls them the 
»shock troops of capitalism,« imposing standards in 
international business and providing »trust« for deal-
making in very uncertain situations. Because they are 
permanently in situations of »conflicts of interests,« they 
have an important power of arbitration in commercial 
contracts between multinational firms (they hold in- 
formation about the two sides), and play a part in their 
enforcement or possible renegotiation. In the absence of 
clear and applicable law, large law firms provide for- 
mats for documents, contracts, written agreements, and 
procedures. At the same time they contribute to build- 
ing the international financial market and the market 
for legal services. In becoming experts and go-betweens 
in the field, they also take part in national or interna- 
tional regulation of business (Favereau et al., 2008). This 
gives them a position of strength vis-à-vis their clients 
and international regulation authorities. They are in a 
position of developers of law, promoting what Edel- 
 
*  This paper was presented at the Valencia Conference on Con-
flicts of Interests, by invitation of Michel Bénichou, President of 
the Federation of European Bar Associations, on October 2, 2009.
1  Joe Flom, a famous partner at Skadden Arps (New York), was 
notorious for having a retainer agreement with clients that  
expressly forbade them to claim conflict of interest in hostile 
takeovers if he was unable to act for them. He even went so  
far as to suggest conflicts rules ought to be abandoned in order 
to prevent shortages of available skills. The situation has inten- 
sified with various corporate crises, such as the collapse of 
Enron, where a number of large law firms were implicated in 
unethical activity.   
2  By social discipline, I mean the social processes such as solidar-
ity, control, and regulation that are made possible by relational 
investments by members of a collective (Lazega and Mounier, 
2002). This definition of social discipline identifies processes that 
are key to collective action, mainly exchanges of resources, con-
trol of commitment, and oligarchic negotiation of »precarious 
values« (Selznick, 1957; Lazega, 2001). 
3  Flood (2005): »The rise of the international law firm is uncon-
querable. Why? State and supra-national lawmaking have not 
been able to keep up with the rapid developments in the glob- 
alization of law. The only institution that has marched in step 
has been the large international law firm. No global transaction – 
contract, distribution agreement, securitization, franchise –  
can be done without them. They have colonized the world of  
global law.«
Please check meaning
prevents ? please check meaning
36 37 Revue für postheroisches Management / Heft 10Revue für postheroisches Management / Heft 10 Time to Shrink to Greatness?Time to Shrink to Greatness?
It more or less forces these firms to overlook many con-
flicts that they call »theoretical.« So the purists’ solu- 
tion would necessarily set a limit to the growth of corpo-
rate law firms.
The pragmatists’ answer to this standpoint is that 
they disclose4 these potential matter conflicts, and that 
clients are often willing to waive conflict issues in 
most areas except litigation, or when there is a risk that 
the firm has special and sensitive inside knowledge 
about the company. Large clients are practical about this 
issue when it suits their interests: for instance, some-
times joint representation cuts through problems, saves 
them money, and expedites the process. Some even assert 
that if they are going to be sued, they would rather have 
a working relationship with the lawyers on the other 
side5. The reason why the clients are willing to waive 
conflict issues is related to the fact that the firm sets 
up a Chinese wall between the lawyers who represent the 
potentially conflicting sides.
In effect, one of the means used by organizations to 
cope with conflicts of interest is the enforcement of a 
»security system« concerning information flows. The key 
aspect of this security system consists in the regulation 
of intraorganizational communication that isolates em- 
ployees from one another when they work on cases cre- 
ating conflicts of interest. The employees are supposed 
not to communicate and therefore not to be able to betray 
the confidence of the organization’s clients. It is this 
regulation of information flows that is sometimes called 
a Chinese wall. It corresponds to a mobile internal com-
partmentalization of the organization. Organizations 
such as large American and European law firms who 
employ hundreds or thousands of lawyers use comput- 
erized systems to isolate and compartmentalize their 
employees, thus providing a formal guarantee that ac- 
cess to confidential information does not occur (Hamer- 
mesh, 1986). This self-regulation, i.e. reliance on inter-
nal organizational devices in order to protect clients’ 
confidence, constitutes a recognized – but questioned – 
way of avoiding disqualification or clients’ suspicion. 
The existence of these »security systems« raises questions 
that have not yet been empirically answered: Are such 
internal boundaries efficient, and what are the condi-
tions of this efficiency? Are organizations right to trust 
these »security systems«? Can self-regulation provide 
the adequate guarantee against the loss of confiden-
tiality? How safe is safe enough when communication 
systems are concerned, and for whom? Is the suspicion 
of external observers (the public, the authorities) jus- 
tified?
The Chinese wall is thus the pragmatists’ answer 
to the purists, the answer that large law firms give to 
this ethical question of the matter check, and which is 
in itself an organizational answer (Morgan, 1987). This 
answer is based originally on Paragraph (b) of S.E.C. Rule 
14e-3 which provides a »safe harbor« exclusion from the 
abstinence requirement for multi-service firms that 
adopt a Chinese wall. Thus brokers in a securities firm 
are permitted to trade stocks of companies that are 
fiduciary clients as long as the firm has implemented 
policies and procedures, reasonable under the circum-
stances, to insure that confidentiality is maintained. In 
the legal profession this is called the screening solu- 
tion, and it is used to try to keep the threat of dis- 
qualification and clients’ suspicion under control. For 
instance, when a lawyer leaves a firm for another firm, 
the firm’s conflicts do not travel with him/her if he/
she is screened from participation in the particular 
matter giving rise to the conflict within his/her new 
firm. This screen is equivalent to a Chinese wall or a 
»cone of silence.« It is important to large law firms that 
clients and judges believe in lawyers’ respect for these 
Chinese walls6.  
man (2003) calls an endogenous notion of law. This set 
of roles heavily depends on being on both sides as often 
as possible, i.e. on using conflicts of interests strate-
gically.
Multiple representation and self-regulation by the legal 
profession
In the case of the legal profession, self-regulation is a 
form of social control exercised over members by enti- 
ties other than the State and its agencies. For lawyers, 
»self« can be the profession (represented by a bar asso- 
ciation, the law firm as an organization, and the indi- 
vidual lawyers themselves). I define conflict of interests 
as a problem stemming from multiple representation by 
a lawyer or a firm. For instance, take a fictitious New 
England firm, Spencer, Grace & Robbins: it receives legal 
work (insurance defense litigation against claimants) 
from two large insurance companies, Insurer One and 
Insurer Two. Insurer Two may want to sue Insurer One 
for alleged practices of unfair competition. At Spencer, 
Grace & Robbins, attorneys will have to choose which 
side they are on. They may not represent both firms on 
this matter. Especially for professions involved in ad- 
versarial practices, it is not entirely unsafe to assume 
that when lawyers have inside information (for instance 
on the other side), they may use it to protect the inter- 
ests of the most lucrative client.  
Lawyers’ mobility within the profession (modern ca- 
reer paths), the fact that many firms are multicity, the 
complexity of many financial transactions, and the like-
lihood of cross-ownership or payment in shares – all these 
factors increase the ethical difficulty of multiple rep- 
resentation. Conflicts can arise with former and with 
current clients. Technical conflicts are not so much in-
teresting as the gray area of potential conflicts in which 
the firm would get too close to the appearance of impro- 
priety to a former or a current client. At least for large 
law firms, this gray area has considerably increased in 
a generation because these firms run into themselves 
systematically, also because the conflicts are sometimes 
hard to uncover (Hazard, 1987, 1988), or at least before it 
is »too late.« It is important to remember that conflicts 
are imputed throughout the firm (the legal entity is the 
firm, and if a lawyer who is a partner in the firm is dis-
qualified by the court for a conflict, the whole firm is 
disqualified).
With respect to this issue, the legal profession is divid-
ed between a purist attitude (mainly held by scholars 
and small firms) and a pragmatist attitude (mainly held 
by large law firms). The large firms try to redefine and 
loosen the rules of ethics in their professional associa-
tions so that the appearance of conflict is not enough to 
disqualify a lawyer. Disqualification, the pragmatists 
say, should be justified only if the old client, or the other 
side, can establish that there is conspiracy.
Practically, before opening a file, a lawyer can check 
for conflicts by looking at whether other parties to 
the new matter are former clients. This is the »adver- 
sity« check. Computers can do it in seconds. If it comes 
up blank, the lawyer is technically and legally safe. To 
simplify, one may say that purists are happy with this 
kind of technical check because it is »politically« clear; if 
there is a potential conflict here, they say, the lawyer 
should refuse to open a file and take the new client on. 
But pragmatists are not happy with this simplistic so- 
lution (and for the time being, they are winning): if 
there is a potential conflict brewing there, the lawyer 
runs a second check – a »matter« check – to see whether 
the former and current matters are the same or sub- 
stantially related. This is where pragmatists and purists 
really diverge. 
The purists say that because conflicts are imputed 
throughout the firm, a conscientious lawyer would have 
to conduct these two checks for all former clients of ev- 
ery lawyer in the firm. In addition, they would have 
to do this usually before they open a file, i.e. before 
the full scope of the new matter is known, without 
really knowing what precise information to look for. 
With hundreds or thousands of lawyers in multicity and 
multinational firms, this becomes next to impossible. 
 4  It is difficult to study the »decision to disclose« and the meth-
ods of disclosure, but there are many incentives not to disclose 
(as there are for the decision to prosecute by inspectors en- 
forcing external regulation, as shown by Hawkins, 1984).
5  One interesting ramification of this is that large law firms 
themselves incorporate the problem into their litigation tactics: 
they systematically use the question of conflicts as purely 
procedural attempts to disqualify the other side’s representa- 
tion (attempts that are sometimes punished as »frivolous« 
by the judge).
6  It is useful to mention that large clients often do not accept 
the Chinese wall argument. They do so when it suits them.  
For instance, corporations identify what they call »positional 
conflicts« as a reason to reject a firm as counsel. Large insurance 
companies do not use law firms that sue insurers. Conversely, 
one of the firms examined in this study protects its right to  
take in new business and be free from questions of conflicts  
by having, in their engagement letter signed by a new client, 
clauses giving the firm the option to be across the table in 
»unrelated matters.« Again, the question becomes a question  
of informed consent: do most clients know what they are doing 
when they waive conflicts? The only advice they usually have  
on the matter is from the lawyer with the conflict. The extent  
to which all clients have to accept such a clause, however, 
remains unknown.  
The large firms try to redefine  
and loosen the rules of ethics in 
their professional associations  
so that the appearance of con- 
flict is not enough to disqualify  
a lawyer.
..........
less interesting here than ?
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Aspects of the organization of law partnerships that limit 
the efficiency of Chinese walls
So the purists and the pragmatists disagree on the value 
of such a screening solution. There is no direct way of 
evaluating this method. I try to do so using an indirect 
approach: an organizational and structural approach. 
In the New England State in which I conducted this 
study in the early 1990s, there were approximately ten 
medium-sized firms in a relatively small State. As most 
of the lawyers I interviewed admitted, conflicts of inter-
ests were everywhere, and managing partners or ethics 
committees had to make decisions regarding the gray 
area of conflicts as often as once to three times a week. 
Clients spread their business around, firms expanded 
and took on an increasingly broad range of businesses, so 
the likelihood that they would not be able to represent 
a client because of a conflict with another client was in-
creasing. Some managing partners said that they were 
rejecting between one and three prospective clients a 
week because of a possible conflict with a current client. 
Most firms did not say anything7. 
At the time, there was enough business and there 
were enough old clients willing to overlook dual repre-
sentation. But managing partners anticipated a time 
when conflicts might prevent their firm from growing 
(in spite of built-in pressures to grow (Nelson, 1988; 
Flood, 1987; Galanter and Palay, 1991; Halliday, 1987)). 
Some thought that there was room for only two to four 
large firms (with more than one hundred lawyers), not 
ten, unless the firms expanded beyond the limits of 
the State. 
In general, an organizational approach has been shown 
to help understand trust violations, such as breaking 
clients’ confidence (Reichman, 1989; Vaughan, 1983). In 
my case study, there are several features of firm organi- 
zation and operations that question the efficiency of 
Chinese walls. The first is that for a law firm there are 
two ways of growing: growth by general representation 
and growth by special representation. During the pre- 
vious twenty years, firms had grown by special repre- 
sentation. This increased enormously the opportunities 
for being confronted with conflicts. There was no busi-
ness strategy that could try to prevent the emergence 
of conflicts; such firms could not make it a priority. 
Another aspect of the organization of work that is 
important for our issue is the workflow policy, particu-
larly the intake (opening new files), which is very often 
decentralized. Formal structure attempts to coordinate 
the work process. In its efforts to organize its practice, 
the firm formally regulates intake (mainly, who decides 
whether or not to take in a case, based on what criteria) 
and assignment (mainly, who will do the work). There 
are many reasons for implementing an intake policy. The 
firm wants to be sure that it is not using its resources 
on work that is either less interesting or less profitable 
than other work that it might be able to get. This means 
that the firm is also preoccupied with situations which 
are not technical conflicts of interest, but which are 
not desirable in business terms. Intake procedures are 
always somewhat flexible. Flexibility, at least in the 
implementation of intake, seems to be imperative be- 
cause workflow depends on the nature of the practice. In 
some areas, clients usually come directly to the lawyer. 
In others, lawyers may work on files because they were 
given these files when they were associates and they 
stayed on these files. Many large firms are well estab- 
lished and corporate clients are passed down from part- 
ner to partner over the years. Clients come to partners 
through referrals from other lawyers in the community 
or through cross-selling by partners from another area 
of practice. 
According to firms’ intake procedures, new clients 
should be cleared with the managing partner. But this 
requirement is not systematically respected. Some part-
 
7  This research was carried out in two steps: a first step during 
which I interviewed forty managing partners, department heads, 
and lawyers with managerial responsibilities in six of these ten 
largest firms about their formal structure and managerial policies; 
and a second step during which I focused on one of these firms 
and conducted a network study of it. The information collected 
during fieldwork is helpful with respect to focusing on the aspects 
of the organization of law firms that limit the efficiency of 
Chinese walls.
There was no business strategy 
that could try to prevent the 
emergence of conflicts; such firms 
could not make it a priority. 
.........
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ners did not even seem to know about it. Lawyers in gen- 
eral do not like to turn work away. Some of the most 
intense fights about which attorneys told Goffman-like 
stories in these firms concerned lawyers who had to 
give up a client, either by passing them on to another 
lawyer or by just letting them go when it appeared that 
there might be a conflict that could not be handled. Law 
firms are professional businesses, with thick carpets and 
a quiet atmosphere where members try to avoid such 
conflicts. In two firms out of six, department heads 
checked the list of new clients for the firm every Mon- 
day; in two other firms, the list was published in the 
newsletter; in the rest of the firms, partners had the 
summary at the monthly partnership meetings. But 
everything was done in a way that encouraged a 
pragmatic attitude toward conflicts: the underlying 
assumption was that »if we opened a file, that means 
that the client is cleared by the technical conflict check 
and that there is no matter conflict.« Partners did not 
enjoy challenging other partners’ intake behavior, and 
the managing partner only intervened when there was a 
problem with a client or when asked to by a partner.
Another policy that was important from this point of 
view was the compensation policy. As firms adopted a 
more entrepreneurial approach to their practice, there 
was a trend toward compensation systems that weighed 
»merit,« client responsibility, and productivity more 
heavily than other factors. This meant competition not 
only between firms, but among partners within the 
same firm. This was an organizational setting in which 
members had strong incentives to use the organization 
for their personal benefit more than for the interests of 
the organization as a whole, including its ethical rep- 
utation. There was another incentive here, it seems to 
me, to be very pragmatic about potential conflicts, and 
to make all sorts of efforts to stretch the »matter« cri- 
terion in a way that was favorable to the individual 
lawyer, or not to disclose the potential conflict to the cli-
ent, or to disclose it in such a way that it did not seem 
threatening.
I could continue with other policies, such as the fact 
that marketing tended to be seriously organized (when 
it was organized at all) only at the departmental level, 
not at the firm level, and as a result even generalist 
firms did not make a conscious effort to prevent put-
ting themselves in situations of conflict. Or the fact that 
a formal peer review system was a very sensitive matter 
(i.e. no one wanted a formal peer review committee that 
would look into each partner’s ethics). Or the fact that 
the relationship between partners and associates was 
not a purely hierarchical one. Intellectual challenges 
were very much valued. In this environment, partners 
always found ways of talking about a matter with 
screened colleagues, for training purposes for instance. 
In addition to all this, the lawyers who moved from 
one firm to another often had a good dose of resent- 
ment for the firm they were leaving. They did not have 
many personal allegiances or incentives not to use in- 
formation they had gathered in a previous workplace. 
This information was part of their human and social 
capital. Maintaining and cashing in on such forms of 
capital is almost what corporate law firms are all about 
(Gilson and Mnookin, 1985). And new forms of collegi- 
ality seemed to accommodate opportunistic behavior 
much better than previous forms. 
All these organizational features of law firms ques- 
tion the efficiency of the screening solution and of joint 
regulation. I would now like to use some results of a net-
work study of a New England corporate law partnership 
to question even further the efficiency of Chinese walls.
Can collegial organizations make weekly, costly, un- 
friendly decisions?
One of the firms involved in this research agreed to a 
network study. This produced a clear picture of the so- 
cial discipline that helps this kind of collegial organiza- 
tion operate on a day-to-day basis. The description of this 
social discipline is relevant to my purpose here. In sum, 
strong ties were available to be used to bridge internal 
organizational boundaries when a problem emerged. 
Small groups of co-workers cut across status boundaries 
and countered the centrifugal effects of stratification. 
Small cliques of mutual advisers cut across geographi- 
cal boundaries and countered the effects of distance 
and differences between offices/markets. Small cliques 
of friends cut across practice boundaries and countered 
the effect of the division of work. This shows that, at 
least in the informal structure of the firm, there was 
a strong and complex relational basis for the integra- 
tion of the organization across its fault lines. Each type 
of relationship contributed in a specific way to the cohe-
sion of the firm. Specific ties observed in each network 
were important for cutting across internal boundaries. 
They held together the great number of different and 
strongly cohesive small groups within the firm. They 
also increased the flexibility and adaptability of the 
informal structure of the firm. Figure 1 summarizes the 
strong ties and cohesive subsets that are the basis of 
this social discipline of the firm and could be activated 
to solve problems or deal with tensions involving such 
differences among members.
Figure 1 
Opening the Pandora’s box of the law firm.This figure indicates 
which strong ties among attorneys in the firm cross-cut internal 
fault-lines in the same firm (Spencer, Grace & Robbins, a New 
England corporate law firm). Source: E. Lazega (2001), The Collegial 
Phenomenon: The Social Mechanisms of Cooperation among Peers in a 
Corporate Law Partnership, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Going back to the example of Insurer One and Insurer 
Two, a potential conflict in which Spencer, Grace & Rob- 
bins are suing their own client can be about two cases 
that are different matters. For instance, Insurer One 
gives the firm litigation work, but then one of the 
partners also decides to represent a real estate company 
with which Insurer One has invested money in a com-
mon project. Tensions arise because, after having com-
mitted itself to invest in this project, Insurer One now 
threatens to withdraw from the deal unless changes are 
made in the project (the example was taken from a 
national newspaper). The two matters are different, the 
actors involved are different, and the pragmatic view 
supports the idea that »there is no conflict, as long 
as there is a Chinese wall between the lawyers in our 
litigation department who do the insurance defense 
work, and the lawyers in our real estate department 
who handle the deal matter.«  
It is possible to look at this internal boundary be- 
tween the litigation department and the corporate de-
partment at Spencer, Grace & Robbins by aggregating 
all the choices made by all the lawyers in three intra-
organizational social networks. This shows, as pictured 
in Figure 1, that the firm has developed informal mech- 
anisms to counter the centrifugal effects of its internal 
boundaries (such as differences in practice, status, and 
office). These mechanisms are important for its internal 
cohesion. In each of the three networks, attorneys clus- 
ter in small social niches. These niches are themselves 
embedded in a system of niches in which strong work 
ties cut across the status boundaries, strong advice ties 
cut across office boundaries (or geographical and mar- 
ket distances), and strong friendship ties cut across 
practice boundaries. So on the one hand, for our con- 
flict between Aetna and the real estate developer, we 
want the corporate department to be isolated from the 
litigation department. But in this case we realize that 
the ties that cut across these boundaries are not only 
professional ties such as advice ties, or co-workers’ ties, 
but also strong friendship ties. The latter are important 
as a mechanism for securing the internal cohesion of 
the firm (in a period when it is not unusual to see whole 
chunks of a firm leave for another firm). Thus the ties 
that cut across the Chinese wall are the friendship ties, 
which are the least visible and the least subject to any 
form of control. At Spencer, Grace & Robbins, friendship 
........ 
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issue reflects the limits of self-regulation, i.e. the risk of 
being disloyal to one of the parties and favoring the 
interests of the more lucrative one.
The organizational features of collegial organiza- 
tions strongly question the efficiency of the »solutions« 
offered by large firms to the problem of conflicts of in- 
terests (Lazega, 1994). Given what we know about the 
social discipline of collegial organizations, it is unlikely 
that these solutions function as credible organizational 
devices. This social discipline more or less forces profes- 
sional firms to overlook many conflicts that their weak 
(procedural) culture conveniently calls »theoretical.« 
Being more ethical thus necessarily sets a limit to the 
growth of the firms. This is why, for example, large law 
firms have long tried to redefine and loosen the rules of 
ethics in such a way that the appearance of conflict in 
the eye of the most cynical observer will not be enough 
to disqualify a lawyer. Large firms seem to accept a form 
of business competition that escapes the control of the 
profession, until they are able to redefine the ethical 
rules of the profession itself. After succeeding in these 
efforts in common law countries, such firms are today 
trying to extend this approach to conflicts of interests 
in civil law countries. Paradoxically, they find even less 
resistance there than in their own countries of origin, 
since civil law countries have less qualms refusing that 
the appearance of conflict is as bad as conflict itself.
Charles Handy argues that it takes a village to build a 
company. Here we do have a village and it has con- 
sequences for the ability of the organization to claim 
that it discourages unethical behavior, that it helps 
members make weekly, costly, unfriendly decisions. If 
attorneys are not heroes, this raises a question for new 
postheroic management thinking: if individual mem-
bers, given the social discipline that helps hold their 
firm together, are unable to deal with conflicts of in- 
terests ethically, is it not time to shrink to greatness? 
And what are the consequences in terms of institution- 
al redesign? ¶
and social discipline were a threat to the ethics of joint 
regulation. The pattern of relationships represented in 
Figure 1 drastically decreases the likelihood of Chinese 
wall efficiency.
A look at Figure 2 strengthens these observations. It 
represents the proximity between attorneys in this 
firm with respect to specialties and practice boundaries 
across which strong friendship ties cut, countering the 
artificial effect of Chinese walls in cases of multiple 
representation and matter-based conflicts. 
Figure 2  
Friendship ties cutting across specialty lines: what credibility 
for Chinese walls? This picture represents friendship ties among 
attorneys at Spencer, Grace & Robbins, a New England corporate  
law firm (litigators in red, corporate lawyers in yellow). For the 
reconstitution of this friendship network in the firm, all the attor-
neys were presented with a list of all the other attorneys em-
ployed by their firm. They were asked to check the names of 
colleagues with whom they had social contacts outside work. 
Source: E. Lazega (2001), The Collegial Phenomenon: The Social Mech-
anisms of Cooperation among Peers in a Corporate Law Partnership, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The least that can be argued here is that given the way 
law firms operate at formal and informal levels, the 
argument that screening solutions solve the problem of 
conflicts is a blanket statement and is not convincing. 
Attorneys in large firms would have to be heroes once a 
week for this solution to be efficient. There is no reason 
to assume that Chinese walls will not be respected at all, 
or that they will be respected universally; it makes good 
sociological sense to think that it depends on the position 
of the individual in the formal and informal structure of 
the organization, and on the pressure put on this mem-
ber by the firm. Professional joint regulation thus meets 
with the more general issue of contemporary decline in 
trust in the professions.
Time to shrink to greatness? 
Collegiality – as an organizational form of the profes- 
sion’s self-regulation, not as a utopian ideology (Laze- 
ga, 2005) – is important for maintaining a high level of 
quality of service. This is because it facilitates a number 
of processes, in particular individual and collective learn- 
ing, that are vital for knowledge-intensive work. But 
while collegiality is efficient for learning, it is not neces-
sarily so for all collective action processes, including 
resolving ethical dilemmas. If collegiality is a guarantee 
of epistemic quality of decisions made by experts, it is 
not necessarily a guarantee of the ethical quality of law- 
yers’ work (Lazega, 1994; 2003). Networks dissolve the 
organizational mechanisms that are set up to deal with 
conflicts of interests. The Weberian question of the con-
ditions in which collegiality, including that of the pro-
fession, is able to ensure this link, thus remains open. 
Under such circumstances, the greater a law firm’s 
ethical commitment, the more business it will turn 
away. Insights from an organizational and network 
study show that a division between large law firms and 
medium-sized and smaller law firms is emerging over 
ethical conflicts. The latter two groups are generally able 
to accommodate the rules, but the large firms would 
like to redefine them. Collegiality works for small firms 
and against the business strategies of large firms. Chinese 
walls are artificial intrafirm barriers between teams that 
are meant to help firms avoid conflicts. While in many 
cases clients sanction the adoption of Chinese walls, the 
courts have cast doubt on their efficacy. The social dis- 
cipline and mechanisms at work among professional 
peers in collegial organizations raise questions about the 
capacity of professions to respect their ethical commit-
ments and regulate themselves in the business world, 
without demanding from their members that they 
behave like heroes. In such corporate law firms, and in 
organizations doing non-routine work in general, this 
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